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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND LABOR CONTROVERSIES
FRED L. HowAR*
The modern labor injunction has had a long and stormy history in the
United States., The usual result of such an injunction has been effectively
to put an end to the labor controversy by giving victory to the employer.
This result is well expressed by the Supreme Court of New York: "In-
junction had (has) been employed to discourage unionization, to frustrate
union activities, to wear out the workers and to bludgeon them into sub-
mission.1'2 Victory to the employer is inevitable when the union is enjoined
from using what is usually its most effective weapon, picketing. However,
picketing is not the only thing that is restrained by the injunction com-
monly issued in labor disputes. More often than not the injunction that
issues prohibits all activities of the union in its contest with the employer.
This includes not only the carrying of banners and other methods of giving
information to the public that are generally connected with picketing', but
also purely informational activities such as advertisements, articles in news-
papers, radio broadcasts, and the distribution of handbills and circulars.
Since picketing itself has been declared to be one aspect of freedom
of speech and expression protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution," the labor injunction raises a very
pressing constitutional question, which is as yet far from settled. This
recognition of picketing as one aspect of free speech is a relatively recent
development. In fact it was not generally recognized until the decision of
Thornhill v. Alabama4 and Carlson v. Californiea by the United States
Supreme Court in 1940. Some state courts have not recognized that picket-
*Attorney, Columbia, Mo., A.B., 1939, University of Missouri, B.S., LL.B.
1942. Now serving in the armed forces of the United States.
1. See FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, The Labor Injunction (1930). The dis-
cussion in the present article starts roughly from the time of the Massachusetts case
of Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888).
2. Coward Shoe, Inc. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union Local 1115F, 177 Misc.
708, 711, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 781, 784 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. County, Special Term, 1941).
3. Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U. S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (1940); American Fed-
eration of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 -(1941).
4. 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
5. 310 U. S. 106 (1940). This proposition was declared to be true in Senn
v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937), but this case could not be con-
sidered as having firmly established the idea.
(25)
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ing is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
and give no protection under the state constitution. Perhaps the most
extreme example of this is the New Jersey case of Mitnick v. Fusrnittre
Workers Uvion, Local No. 66.6 In this case the union defended the suit
for injunction on the basis of the guarantees of freedom of speech and press
found in the state and federal- constitutions. As to the Federal Constitution,
the New Jersey Court of Chancery said only that "the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution is not involved." As to the protection
given by the state constitution, the court said: "There are two classes of
constitutional rights: (1) Absolute rights; and (2) Qualified rights, which
latter are more in the nature of privileges." These absolute rights were
said to include "acquiring, possessing, and protecting property" while the
"so called right of free speech" was classed as a qualified right, in the nature
of a privilege. On the basis of these premises the conclusion of the court,
granting the injunction, was inevitable. The court expressed its conclusion
as follows: "The complainant and his customers are in the lawful exercise
of their inherent or absolute rights; the defendants cannot be permitted
to exercise their qualified rights, or privileges, in such manner as will be
destructive of the absolute rights of c6mplainanit and his customers.",
Thus the right of property of the complainant in his business is said
to be absolute. The activities of the union interfere with this right. Since
the right of free speech is only a privilege, it can not be used to interfere in
any way with this exalted right of property in the business. It follows
logically enough, then, that the activities of the union, any activities what-
soever that interfere with the business, may be, in fact must be, enjoined.
This may be the well settled interpretation of the New Jersey Constitution
but it should be noted that not a single case, local or foreign, was cited to
support these unusual statements. This is very definitely not the inter-
pretation given to analogous provisions of other state constitutions or the
Federal Constitution. In fact the Supreme Court of the United States has
repeatedly stated that freedom of speech and of the press, along with the
other freedoms protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are
6. 124 N. J. Eq. 147, 200 At. 553 (Ch. 1938). In this case the com-
plainant refused to sign a closed shop agreement with the defendant union and the
union distributed circulars asking the public not to buy furniture manufactured
by complainant and sold at various retail stores. It should be noted that this case
was decided two years before the Thornhill and Carlson cases.
7. 124 N. J. Eq. 147, 152, 200 AtI. 553, 555-556 (Ch. 1938).
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH
fundamental and that only the preservation of the nation itself is a justi-
fication for the abridgment of these freedoms.8 As it was expressed by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, "But,
although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are
not in their -nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction, if the
particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the State
from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral."9 In
view of this, the summary way in which the New Jersey court dismisses
the claim of defendant to protection under the Federal Constitution is
pathetic. Most state courts do not get this far from the beaten path.
Even before it was recognized that picketing was protected as a form
of free speech, many of the state courts admitted that labor unions had more
than a theoretical right to organize. These courts said that while picketing
and other activities of the unions on strike did in fact injure the business
of the employer, it was damnum absque injuria. The economic struggle
between employer and employees, like competition between businesses, was
said by these courts to create in the striking laborers such self interest as to
be legal justification for the injuries inflicted on the employer. The laborers
can strike in order to obtain higher wages and better working conditions.
These are legitimate ends toward which labor is free to strive with all law-
ful methods. If the employer is injured by such activity, he can not com-
plain of his injury, because any injury to the employer is incidental to the
ultimate lawful purpose of the strike and thus there is no ground for injunc-
tion. Since all courts seem to recognize the right of labor to organize and
strike, at least in theory, this result would seem to be inevitable. This idea is
well expressed as follows, "The law, having granted workmen the right to
strike to secure better conditions from their employers, grants them also the
use of those means and agencies (picketing), not inconsistent with the rights
of others, that are necessary to make the strike effective."'1
Not all courts agreed with this, however. Especially during the period
8. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S.
353 (1937); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Schneider v. State,
308 U. S. 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940). See also
an excellent statement of this in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in
Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287,
310 (1941).
9. 274 U. S. 357, 373 (1927). Italics added.
10. Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers' Local Union No.
131, 165 Ind. 421, 431, 75 N. E. 877, 880 (1905).
1943 ]
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before 1920, many courts,11 while admitting the right of labor to organize
and strike, in theory, held that there could be no such thing as peaceful
picketing. According to the arguments of such courts, any picketing, in and
of itself, no matter how peaceful and devoid of actual threats of physical
violence, amounted to intimidation. Since picketing was intimidation, it
was not peaceful. This intimidation interfered with the free access of other
workers and customers to the place of business of the employer and thus
amounted to a nuisance and could be enjoined on well recognized equitable
principles. Some of the opinions that followed this argument were very
emotional and in fact seemingly would enjoin any acts of labor that would
make the strike effective. 1 2 Probably the best (worst?) expression of this
view is found in Atclison,.T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gee'3 where the court said,
"There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than
there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching."
The District Court of Appeals of California had this to say on the subject:
"Such conduct (picketing) . . . we think not only constituted an illegal
interference with plaintiffs' (employers') rights, but became, and was, as
to them a private nuisance." It is obvious to all "... God fearing, liberty
loving, home defending, and humanity helping . . ." people that such
picketing is unlawful.' 4 These courts gave any contention for protection
of freedom of speech short shift, if they mentioned it at all. Of course, some
recognition has for a long time been given to the proposition that freedom
of speech and press should be protected as much when exercised by labor
11. A. R. Barnes and Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 232 Ill.
424, 83 N. E. 940 (1908); Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union No. 218, 110 Fed. 698
(C. C. N. D. Ohio 1901); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C. C.
S. D. Iowa 1905); George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n. of United
States and Canada, 72 N. J. Eq. 653, 66 At]. 953 (1907); Pierce v. Stablemen's
Union Local No. 8760, 156 Cal. 70, 103 P. 324 (1909); St. Germain v. Bakery and
Confectionery Workers' Union No. 9 of Seattle, 97 Wash. 282, 166 P. 665 (1917);
Ex parte Stout, 82 Tex. Cr. Rep. 183, 198 S. W. 967 (1917); Rosenberg v. Retail
Clerk's Ass'n., Local 428, 39 Cal. App. 67, 177 P. 864 (1918); Local Union No. 313,
Hotel and Restaurant Employees v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W. 450 (1918);
Moore v. Cooks', Waiters' and Waitresses' Union No. 402, 39 Cal. App. 538, 179 P.
417 (1919).
12. Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union No. 2118, 110 Fed. 698 (C. C. N. D. Ohio
1901); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 F. 582 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1905);
Moore v. Cooks', Waiters' and Waitresses' Union No. 402, 39 Cal. App. 538, 179
P. 417 (1919).
13. 139 Fed. 582, 584 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1905).
14. Moore v. Cooks', Waiters' and Waitresses' Union No. 402, 39 Cal. App.
538, 540, 179 P. 417 (1919).
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH
in the course of a strike, as in any other case. 15 It should be noted, how-
ever, that these cases were instances of distribution of circulars, or ordinances
that try to prohibit all picketing. However, at this time and later most
courts look hard at the injury to the business of, the employer and allow an
injunction. A flagrant example of this approach is the case of Hotel and
Railroad News Co. v. Clark.'8 In this case there was no picketing and no
violence. The employees only published a circular with their claims as to
the facts of the dispute. The Massachusetts court granted an injunction
because the statements in the circular were held to be inaccurate and had
the effect of holding the plaintiff up to public contempt and ridicule. The
court found that the circular was intended to harm the business of the
plaintiff and therefore granted a very broad injunction against any publi-
cation by the defendant union ".. . for the purpose of coercing the plaintiff
to reinstate its discharged employees and to employ only union labor." This
is, of course, a flagrant abridgment of freedom of the press, but the case
follows the lead of earlier Massachusetts cases,' 7 in placing chief emphasis
upon the injury to the employer's business and sliding over the rights of
the employees.
There are also two general types of state statutes or city ordinances
which have, until recently, been upheld in their application against striking
laborers in spite of the claim of protection of freedom of press and speech
'by both state and federal constitutions. The first type of ordinance is one
that forbids the carrying of signs, or loitering, or, in a few cases, expressly
forbids picketing, on the streets. The reasoning of the courts in upholding
such ordinances is that the streets are subject to police regulation so that
traffic will not be obstructed. The ordinances have been held to be valid
as such police regulations. 8 The other prevalent type of ordinance often
applied to strike activities is one that prohibits or licenses the distribution
of handbills. These ordinances have also been upheld as valid police regu-
15. Marx and Haas Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133, 67 S. W.
391 (1902); City of St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S. W. 30 (1908).
16. 243 Mass. 317, 137 N. E. 534 (1922); Contra, Dr. Lietzman, Dentist
Inc. v. Radio Broadcasting Station W. C. F. L., 282 II. App. 203 (1935).
17. Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888); Vegelahn v.
Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896).
18. Commonwealth v. McCafferty, 145 Mass. 384, 14 N. E. 451 (1888);
Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruise, 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657 (1914); Ex parte Stout,
82 Tex. Cr. Rep. 183, 198 S. W. 697 (1917); Watters v. City of Indianapolis,
191 Ind. 671, 134 N. E. 482 (1922); Thomas v. City of Indianapolis, 195 Ind.
440, 145 N. E. 550 (1924); O'Rourke v. City of Birmingham, 27 Ala. App. 133,
168 So. 206 (1936).
1943]
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lations on the ground of preventing the littering of the streets and thus
protecting public health.19 The claim of protection by constitutional guaran-
tee of freedom of press was denied, the courts saying that such freedom is
subject to such reasonable police regulation. Also the argument of Common-
weadth v. Davis" that the city owns the streets and parks and can thus
prevent their use in the exercise of the rights of free speech and press, just
as any private property owner, has sometimes been accepted. These cases
were all in effect overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Sclneider
v. State.21 This case held that freedom of speech and press as guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution was violated by such an ordinance and the fact
that the ordinance prevented the littering of streets was -not a justification
for the abridgment of the constitutionally protected liberty. This case did
not arise out of a labor dispute but it effectively decided the invalidity of
such ordinances, no matter to whom applied.
Some state courts have themselves come to the conclusion that anti-
picketing or loitering statutes violate the constitutional right of free speech. 22
These statutes are in such cases held to violate both the state and federal
constitutions. The right of the laborer to strike is recognized, picketing is
held to be a method of presenting his side of the controversy to the public
and thus it is protected as one aspect of the constitutional right of free
speech. The fact that in the process the property of the employer in his
business may be injured is not a valid reason for allowing abridgment of
these constitutional rights. It is damnum absque injvria. Statutes that pur-
port to regulate picketing but confine it within too narrow limits also have
been struck down because they violate this constitutional right of free
speech.2
3
Since the United States Supreme Court has definitely held that picket-
ing, when used to give publicity to the facts of a labor dispute, is one form
19. In re Anderson, 69 Neb. 686, 96 N. W. 149 (1903); City of Milwaukee
v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383, 234 N. W. 352 (1931); Sieroty v. City of Huntington
Park, 111 Cal. App. 377, 295 P. 564 (1931); Dziatkiewic v. Township of Maple-
wood, 115 N. J. L. 37, 178 AtI. 205 (1935); City of Milwaukee v. Snyder, 230
Wis. 131, 283 N. W. 301 (1939), rev'd, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
20. 162 Mass. 510, 39 N. E. 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U. S. 43 (1897).
.21. 308 U. S. 147 (1939); See also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444
(1938) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
22. City of St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S. W. 30 (1908); People
v. Harris, 104 Colo. 386, 91 P. (2d) 989 (1939); City of Reno v. Second Judicial
District Court, 59 Nev. 416, 95 P. (2d) 994 (1939).
23. People v. Garcia, 37 Cal. App. (2d) 753, 98 P. (2d) 265 (1939); People
v. Gidaly, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 758, 93 P. (2d) 660 (1939).
[Vol. 8
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of free speech and thus is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution,24 many of the state courts have changed
from their former decisions. Relying on these United States Supreme Court
cases, they hold that injunctions prohibiting, or statutes prohibiting or too
greatly restricting, picketing are unconstitutional.2
5
The argument of the United States Supreme Court in deciding that
picketing, as such, is one form of the exercise of free speech, and thus pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Con-
stitution, is persuasive.
The case of Thornhill v. AlabamaP26 may well be called the foundation
of this view. This case came up on a prosecution under an Alabama statute
that prohibited loitering about the premises or picketing for the purpose
of hindering, interfering with or injuring a lawful business.27 The de-
fendant was convicted under this statute because he picketed a plant where
he and other workers were on strike. There was no violence or threat of
physical force or intimidation. Defendant was at a picket post and quietly
asked others not to return to work. The statute prohibited all practical
means open to the workers of presenting their side of the controversy to the
public. The United States Supreme Court held that the public, as well
as the immediate parties to the dispute, had an important interest in such
controversies. Thus the giving of information concerning the dispute to the
public was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
24. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (1940);
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941); Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc., 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
25. Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local 753, 377 Ill.
76, 35 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941); People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d)
206 (1941); Byck Bros. v. Owen Martin, 4 CCH Labor Cases No. 60,430
(Jefferson C. C. of Ky., Ch. 2d Div. 1941); Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon
Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local 753, 38 N. E. (2d) 972 (Ill. 1942); Mason and
Dixon Lines v. Odom, 18 S. E. (2d) 841 (Ga. 1942).
26. 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
27. Section 3448, Code of Alabama, 1923: "Any person or persons, who, with-
out just cause or legal excuse therefor, go near to or loiter about the premises or
place of business of any person, firm, corporation, or association of people, engaged
in lawful business, for the purpose or with the intent of influencing, or inducing
other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell to, have business dealings with, or
be employed by such persons, firm, corporation, or association, or who picket
the works or place of business of such other persons, firms, corporations, or asso-
ciations of persons, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering with or
injuring any lawful business or enterprise of another, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor; but nothing herein shall prevent any person from soliciting trade or
business from a competitive business."
1943]
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stitution against abridgment by state action. This publicizing of their
side of the controversy was accomplished for the strikers by picketing, and
thus picketing was held to be protected by the Federal Constitution as one
aspect of the exercise of the right of free speech. The Court asserted: "The
freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution em-
braces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters
of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punish-
ment .... Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in
this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies
of their period.
"In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information
concerning'the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within the area
of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution .... Free discussion
concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes ap-
pears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes
of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society."28
The state can, of course, regulate such labor disputes in the public
interest but it can not in so doing abridge these constitutional rights of the
workers. The statute in question here is so broad that it prohibits "... every
practicable, effective means whereby those interested-including the employ-
ees directly affected-may enlighten the public on the nature and causes
of a labor dispute.' 29 The fact that the legislature chose this method of
exercising its undoubted police power to regulate such disputes does not
make it any less objectionable to the Constitution. "Abridgment of the
liberty of such discussion can be justified only where the clear danger of
substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to
test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of
public opinion."' ° This is an expression of what has come to be known as
the clear and present danger test, first set out by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Schenck v. United States.31 In the instant case there is no such danger and
thus the statute is invalid on its face.
In the case of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union,'2 Mr. Justice
28. 310 U. S. 88, 101-103 (1940).
29. Id. at 104.
30. Id. at 104-105.
31. 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
32. 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
[Vol. 8
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Brandeis said by way of dictum that the right of labor to publicize its side
of a controversy, by means of picketing as well as other means, is pro-
tected by the Federal Constitution. However, the ThornhZil case is the first
one to squarely hold that such protection is given by the Federal Consti-
tution.
The United States Supreme Court decided Carlson v. California'3 the
same day as the Tkorn ill case. Here an ordinance of Shasta County, Cali-
fornia, prohibited picketing on a public highway for various stated pur-
poses.34 This ordinance was approximately as broad as the statute involved
in the Thornlill case, and was held invalid mainly on the authority of that
case. The ordinance prevented all interested persons from carrying signs
in the vicinity of a labor dispute so as to give information about the dispute.
Thus it very directly abridged freedom of speech as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore could not stand. The conclusion of
the Court was as follows: "The power and duty of the State to take ade-
quate steps to preserve the peace and protect the privacy, the lives, and
the property of its residents cannot be doubted. But the ordinance in
question here abridges liberty of discussion under circumstances presenting
no clear and present danger of substantive evils within the allowable area
of state control."' 5 Here the Court again uses the clear and present danger
test in deciding whether the state infringement on liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment is permissible or not.
The next important case affirming the protection given to labor's rights
to picket by the Fourteenth Amendment was American Federation of Labor
33. 310 U. S. 106 (1940).
34. The ordinance as set out in the case, Id. at 109, is as follows: "It shall be'
unlawful for any person, in or upon any public street, highway, sidewalk, alley
or other public place in the County of Shasta, State of California, to loiter in
Tront of, or in the vicinity of, or to picket in front of, or in the vicinity of,
or to carry, show or display any banner, transparency, badge or sign in front
of, or in the vicinity of, any works, or factory, or any place of business or
employment, for the purpose of inducing or influencing, or attempting to induce
or influence, any person to refrain from entering any such works, or factory, or
place of business, or employment, or for the purpose of inducing or influencing, or
attempting to induce or influence, any person to refrain from purchasing or using
any goods, wares, merchandise, or other articles, manufactured, made or kept for
sale therein, or for the purpose of inducing or influencing, or attempting to induce or
influence, any person to refrain from doing or performing any service or labor in
any works, factory, place of business or employment, or for the purpose of in-
timidating, threatening or coercing, or attempting to intimidate, threaten or coerce
any person who is performing, seeking or obtaining service or labor in any such
works, factory, place of business or employment."
35. Id. at 113.
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v. Swing. 6 This case did not involve a statute. It was an appeal from an
injunction issued by the courts of Illinois. This injunction was very broad,
"ranging from peaceful persuasion to acts of violence." There was no labor
dispute here between,-the plaintiff, Swing, and his immediate employees.
The picketing was carried out by a union that was trying to organize
plaintiff's beauty parlor. This lack of dispute between employer and his
employees was made the basis for the broad injunction in the state courts.
The United States Supreme Court held that "Such a ban on free communica-
tion is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech. . . .A state
cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free
communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between em-
ployers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those
directly employed by him. . . .The right of free communication cannot
therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an
employer, even though they are not in his employ."'3 This case is thus
seen to be a very strong expression of the constitutionally protected right
of labor to picket in order to present its side of a labor dispute to the pub-
lic.3 Here there was no general statute that would prevent the proper
exercise of free speech in all such disputes. It was rather an injunction
issued by the state courts of Illinois on the specific facts of the case. How-
ever, the injunction was very broad and impinged on the rights of these
laborers just as the enforcement of a statute. Consequently it is uncon-
stitutional just as a statute would be. The fact that it is an injunction does
not, and should not, make any difference as long as it is found to deny the
constitutional right of free speech. In this case the United States Supreme
Court refused to make any distinction. Other cases are not so clear on this
point, as will be pointed out later.
Thus by these cases, Thornhill, Carlson and Swing, the United States
Supreme Court has definitely laid down the principle that picketing is one
form of the exercise of the right of free speech and press and as such is
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Con-
stitution. Some of the later cases cast doubt as to just how far the United
36. 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
37. Id. at 325-326.
38. Mr. Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion in this case in which
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes joined. This dissent was based on questions of procedure
and not on the substantive rights of the defendants considered by the majority
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States Supreme Court is willing to uphold this protection. The case of Milk
Wagon- Drivers Union of Chzicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,9
decided the same day as the Swing case, was the first to cast such doubt.
This case is very hard to reconcile with the Swing case. The majority opin-
ion purports to justify the allowance of the injunction on what they call
a context or background of violence. The Supreme Court reversed the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and denied an injunction in another case
growing out of the same controversy.40 This case was based on the Norris-
LaGuardia anti-injunction act,4 1 which denies federal courts jurisdiction
to grant labor injunctions except in special circumstances which were not
shown to exist in this case. The idea of the Meadowmoor case is an ex-
tension of the well recognized idea that violence, intimidation and coercion
in connection with picketing can always be enjoined. The constitutional
protection of free speech does not extend to such acts of physical violence
and the consequent coercion and intimidation. The Court held that the
past acts of violence were neither episodic nor isolated; that the background
of violence would carry over into future peaceful picketing. Thus such peace-
ful picketing would amount to intimidation and therefore was 'not pro-
tected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and could be
enjoined. Whether there was such violence as to justify this deprivation of
constitutional freedom is not at all clear. Mr. Justice Black, in his vigorous
and well reasoned dissent, analyzes the evidence of violence found in the
record, and finds that most of it occurred in 1934, eight months before any
picketing occurred and four years before the state courts granted any injunc-
tion. This violence occurred under circumstances that made it doubtful
whether the defendant union was responsible. 42 From his analysis of the
record Mr. Justice Black concluded "that the forfeiture of the right to free
speech effected by the injunction is not warranted.1 43 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in the majority opinion points out that an injunction and not a broad
statute is involved (the same was true in the Swing case), and indicates
that this is a reason for different treatment. He seems to argue that an
39. 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
40. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products,
Inc., 311 U. S. 91 (1940).
41. 29 U. S. C. § 113(a).
42. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadomoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 314 (1941). Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in this dissenting
opinion.
43. Id. at 316.
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injunction is fitted to the particular facts of the individual case and there-
fore the United States Supreme Court should be slower to hold it bad than
would be the case if a statute were involved. No reason is given for this
in the opinion and it would seem that there is none. The injunction allowed
here is very broad and it abridges the freedom of the members of the de-
fendant union as much as, if not more than, would a prosecution under
a broad statute such as was involved in the Thornhill and Carlson cases. 4
Here the injunction is a threat of punishment to all members of the union
and perhaps to non-members who may seek to help them. This punishment
will be by the summary process of contempt, not by indictment or informa-
tion and a jury trial, as would be the case if a statute were involved. The
members of the union must act in furtherance of the strike (or else give up
the struggle) under the threat of such summary punishment if they should
chance to violate the very broad and inexact wording of the injunction,
which prohibits them "From interfering, hindering or otherwise discourag-
ing or diverting, or attempting to interfere with, hinder, discourage or divert
persons desirous of or contemplating purchasing milk and cream or other
products aforesaid, including the use of said signs, banners or placards, and
walking up and down in front of said stores as aforesaid, and further pre-
venting the deliveries to said stores of other articles which said stores sell
through retail; (or) From threatening in any manner to do the foregoing
acts; ... ."45 Thus it would seem that there is as much of an "overhanging
and undefined threat to free utterance" in this injunction as there was
in the Thornhzill and Carlson statutes, but in the majority opinion Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said there was not" and that the injunction should
be sustained. The majority opinion emphasizes the context of violence and
indicates that when utterances are used as part of a plan or scheme of force
and intimidation, they lose their character of an appeal to reason and thus
lose their constitutional protection. This comes close to the idea of "verbal
act" which was set forth in the case of Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range
Co.47 as follows: "In the case of an unlawful conspiracy, the agreement to
act in concert when the signal is published, gives the words 'Unfair,' 'We
don't patronize,' or similar expressions, a force not inhering in the words
44. The language of the injunction is remarkably like that of the statutes
held bad in the Thornhill and Carlson cases. Mr. Justice Black makes a revealing
comparison, Id. at 309, Footnote 10.
45. As quoted in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, id. at 308.
46. Id. at 292.
47. 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
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themselves, and therefore exceeding any possible right of speech which
a single individual might have. Under such circumstances they become what
have been called 'verbal acts,' and as much subject to injunction as the use
of any other force whereby-property is unlawfully damaged."4 8 In the
Meadownwor case Mr. Justice Frankfurter says that peaceful picketing
in the future will amount to intimidation because of the fear which had
been generated by past violence and which will carry over and cling to such
peaceful picketing in the future. Thus this future peaceful picketing is in
the same class as the verbal acts in the Buhcks Stove case and can like-
wise be enjoined regardless of the constitutional protection ordinarily given
it as one aspect of free speech.
However, the majority opinion seems to realize that it has gone very
far in limiting the rights of free speech, for in the last two pages of the
opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter tries to justify the result as not so bad
after all.49 In this he has little success. He points out again that this is an
injunction and not a statute, that the defendant union can try to get it
modified when conditions have changed and that if the injunction is en-
forced in the broad aspect which its language would normally imply
(but which this opinion denies) then there would be a remedy by another
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. It is also said that Illinois has,
not only the right and power, but the duty to protect its citizens and their
businesses from bombings, window smashings and other acts of violence.
This has always been admitted by everyone who considers the question.
However, the Court here says that there is no reason why Illinois can not
use the injunction of its courts rather than the policemen's club to accom-
plish this. When an injunction as restrictive of free speech as the present
one is used, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is
compelling reason. Of course a narrow injunction against violence would
be proper. The fact that Illinois, by its courts, chooses to use a broad in-
junction that is found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, should have
no more weight than an indication of legislative preference shown by the en-
actment of statutes and ordinances. This legislative preference has repeat-
edly been held not to justify abridgment of free speech and press.50 The
48. Id. at 439.
49T.l\Milk Wagoi6 Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 297 (1941).
50. Hemdon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S.
147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
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choice of the courts should be no greater justification for overriding the
constitutional guarantees.
However, what seems to be the actual basis for the opinion has not been
mentioned yet. This is the philosophy of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that
state action should be upheld if at all possible. This will be fully discussed
later.
It should also be noted that the majority opinion does not mention or
consider in any way the clear and present danger test.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, holding that the injunc-
tion violates the Fourteenth Amendment, is based on the importance which
he attaches, and rightly so, to the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
speech. He says, ". . . I view the guaranties of the First Amendment as the
foundation upon which our governmental structure rests and without which
it could not continue to endure as conceived and planned. Freedom to speak
and write about public questions is as important to the life of our govern-
ment as is the heart to the human body. In fact, this privilege is the heart
of our government. If that heart be weakened, the result is debilitation;
if it be stilled, the result is death." 1
In addition to what has already been said, this dissenting opinion points
out that the injunction covers the acts alleged by the complaint and the
coniplaint objects to stories in the newspapers of Chicago. Thus the
injunction, by orthodox construction, would prevent any mention of
the union's side of the controversy in the public press. The dissent
also points out that there was no clear and present danger that de-
manded such a broad injunction for the protection of the public. Rather
this broad language seems designed to prevent the presentation of the
union's side of the controversy to the public in any manner, shape or form.
This not only violates the rights of the union to give publicity to its side
of the controversy but also denies to the public the right to receive informa-
tion as to both sides of a controversy in which it has a vital interest. The
injunction, of course, will protect the business of the plaintiff, but it should
be only the protection of the public, not the individual, that justifies abridg-
ment of free speech. If this is not so the anomalous result of some of the
earlier cases is resurrected. These cases said that they recognized the right
of the union to organize and strike. However, when this happened and the
employer asked an injunction, the courts said that the laborers could not
51. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U S. 287, 301 (1941).
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injure the property of the plaintiff. His business was property and since
the picketing and other acts of the union hurt the plaintiff's business, these
acts would be enjoined, it being the historic jurisdiction of equity to issue
injunctions to protect property. Thus these courts gave lip service to the
rights of unions, but whenever the unions did anything to make their rghts
effective, the courts would grant an injunction. The effect of these injunc-
tions was to deny the rights of the labor unions5 2 The majority opinion
seems to depart from the firm foundation of the Thornhlill, Carlson and
Swing cases and starts back down the hill to the fallacious reasoning and
consequent distorted results just described.
Mr. Justice Reed also wrote a dissenting opinion in this case. He
admits that Illinois can protect its citizens against violence, but adds, "This
authority of Illinois to protect its storekeepers must be exercised, however,
within the framework of the Constitution. '5 3 The remedy for any fear or
coercion that peaceful picketing may carry over from past violence is said
to be the maintenance of order, not a denial of the right of free speech.
The fact that this is an injunction and not a statute is no basis for dis-
tinction. It is not shown that the union was responsible for the violence and
the possible .fear that peaceful picketing may carry with it thus is not
sufficient to justify the suspension of the constitutional right of free speech.
to the thousands of members of the union. If an injunction is allowed here
the rights maintained in the Thornhill case collapse at the first attack.
The arguments of Mr. Justice Reed are cogent and to the point, and to-
gether with the arguments and factual analysis of Mr. Justice Black seem
clearly to show that the majority opinion actually allows infringement
of the right of free speech in a matter of great public concern for the insuf-
ficient reason of long past violence that might cause a carryover of some
fear if peaceful picketing were continued. This possible fear seems small
basis on which to rest such an abridgment of free speech.
The Meadowmoor case is not alone in allowing a state injunction which
abridges freedom of speech. In Carpenters and Joiners Union of America,
. 52. Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888); Vegelahn v.
Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896); Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Pro-
tective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898); Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921); Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
245 U. S. 229 (1917); Hotel and Railroad News Co. v. Clark, 243 Mass. 317,
137 N. E. 534 (1922). See also cases cited in footnote 11 supra.
53. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 319 (1941).
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Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe" the United States Supreme Court in a five
to four decision allowed an injunction at least as questionable as the one
allowed in the Meadowmoor case. Again Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote
the majority opinion. This case is especially doubtful when compared with
the Swing case. In this case Ritter let a contract for the construction of
a building. The contractor used non-union labor and the carpenters and
joiners union, together with a painters union, picketed the cafe owned by
Ritter, about a mile and a half from the site of the new building. The cafe
was unionized and the employees walked out because of the picketing, which
resulted in a decline in the business of about sixty per cent. The Texas state
courts granted an injunction because the picketing violated the state anti-
trust law.55 This injunction only prohibited picketing the cafe or carrying
banners in front of it. It did not prevent picketing at other places or other
means of presenting the facts of the dispute to the public. 6 This majority
opinion construes the position of the union as claiming that picketing, pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment, is an absolute right and is subject
to no regulation whatever, and as to this concludes that the fact that there
is a labor dispute does not give any greater rights than those given by the
Fourteenth Amendment to other exercises of the right of free speech. The
opinion then says that Texas can limit the sphere within which the activ-
ities of the labor controversy may be carried out. This is here limited to
those directly involved in the dispute (the union and the contractor) and
the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent this. Mr. Justice Black again
wrote a dissenting opinion,"r as did Mr. Justice Reed. -The dissent of Mr.
Justice Black relies on the Thornhill case. He says that this injunction in-
fringes on the freedom of speech which the Court in the Thornhill case said
was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The purpose of the injunction was to prevent the picketing and thus prevent
the union from conveying information to the public in front of the cafe.
54. 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (1942).
55. Texas Penal Code, art. 1632 et seq. (1936); Carpenters and Joiners
Union, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 149 S. W. (2d) 694 (Ct. of Civ. App.
Texas, 1941).
56. This is .the interpretation given by Mr. Justic; Frankfurter, Carpenters
and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 62 Sup. Ct. 807,
808 (1942). Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent, says that this may be correct but
that it would seem that the theory of the state court would allow an injunction
against any means of persuading the public not to patronize Ritter's Cafe. Id. at
812.
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This prevention was to protect the cafe business of the plaintiff from the
injury consequent to the picketing. This violates the principles laid down
in the Thornh7i0l case and presents no sufficient justification for 'the infringe-
ment of the right of free speech. The fact that the union could give publicity
to its side of the controversy in other ways and places does not lessen or
justify the abridgment of the right of free speech which the union sought
to exercise in an appropriate place and manner.5 In a separate dissent
Mr. Justice Reed points out clearly that the reason for the injunction was
to prevent injury to the business of the plaintiff. He admits that picketing
is subject to some regulation, is not an absolute right, but concludes that
the injunction here under consideration is not a proper regulation. He points
out that the majority opinion would limit the right to picket, when picketing
is not conducted by employees of the business" picketed, to members of the
same industry. He concludes that this is bad both because the scope of an
industry is undefined and because such a limitation is unwarranted "So
long as civil government is able 'to function normally for the protection of
its citizens. . .."59
When this case is compared closely with the case of American Federa-
tion of Labor v. Swing60 they are impossible of reconciliation. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter wrote both opinions and in both the Court was faced with
peaceful picketing. In neither was the picketing carried out by employees
of the business picketed. In the Swing case the Court says that "A state
cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free
communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between
employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those
directly employed by him. The interdependerice of economic interest of
all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace. '' 61 It is this
last sentence which Mr. Justice Frankfurter seizes upon to take the Ritter
case out of the authority of the Swing case. The Ritter case did not in-
volve members of the same industry. However, in the Ritter case there
was a very close connection between Ritter and the employment of non-
union construction workers, which caused the controversy. Ritter was the
owner of the cafe that was picketed and also was the owner of the building
58. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939).59. Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe,
Sup. Ct. 807, 815-816 (1942). It should be noted that this is in effect another
expression of the clear and present danger test.
60. 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
61. Id. at 326.
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that was being constructed with non-union labor. The logical place for the
union to exert pressure was on Ritter who had ultimate control of the con-
struction. Whether he could change this particular contract is not dis-
closed. However, as pointed out by the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Black,62 this was the place where pressure would have the most effect on con-
tractors who directly hire the labor. Thus there would seem to be as close
a connection here as in the case of other members of the same industry, as
was involved in the Swing case. However, the United States Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, apparently sees a dis-
tinction, for they allowed Texas to exclude picketing of the owner's other
business, the cafe, from the area of permissible activity in a labor dispute.
This contrasts greatly with the opinion in the Swing case which allowed
picketing by workers of the same industry even though they were strangers
to the particular business picketed and there was no dispute of any kind
between the employer and his immediate employees. The Court in the Swing
case says, "Communication by such employees (in the same industry) of the
facts of a dispute, deemed by them to be relevant to their interests, can no
more be barred because of concern for the economic interests against which
they are seeking to enlist public opinion than could the utterance in Thorn-
Ail's case." 63 However, where the picketers are not of the same industry
there is apparently no such constitutional protection given to the facts of
a dispute, deemed by the workers to be relevant to their interests. There
seems to be no substantial difference and the criticism of this basis for dis-
tinction found in Mr. Justice Reed's dissent in the Ritter case is sound. In
both cases the picketers had sufficient interest and their exercise of free
speech should be protected. The clear and present danger test would so
protect it.
The protection of individual business, which seems to be the basis
of the Ritter case, does not satisfy this clear and present danger test. The
different result in the two cases could possibly be reached on the basis of the
slight difference in facts. However, this difference is not persuasive. The
United States Supreme Court in the Swing case would not allow Illinois to
limit permissible picketing to the immediate employees of the employer
picketed, but said that such activites were protected by the Federal Con-
stitution when carried on by anyone in the same industry. In the Ritter
62. Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe,
62 Sup. Ct. 807, 815-816 (1942).
63. 312 U. S. 321, 326 (1941).
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case the picketing was carried on by a union not of the same industry as
the business picketed and the United States Supreme Court said that Texas
could limit the permissible field of such activity so as to outlaw this picket-
ing. In both cases the parties picketing were taking the most effective way
of presenting their side of the controversy to the public and in neither case
was any evidence produced to indicate a malicious desire to do harm for the
sake of doing harm. The harm in both cases was incidental to the legitimate
ends of the unions; securing employment for union members and recogni-
tion of the union. The difference in facts as regards the same industry
is superficial at best. Under the complex economic structure of today the
control of parts of many different industries may be and often is in the hands
of the same person. If the "same industry" limitation is adhered to strictly,
as the Ritter case would seem to indicate the Court is doing, it will result
in many workers not being able to exert pressure on the people who direct
the acts against which they complain. Ritter was the logical person to be
picketed. Under this decision he is free to enjoy all the benefits of unioniza-
tion of his cafe and other unions can not effectively make known to the
public his non-union activities in other fields of econoinic activity in which
he may be engaged. This use of the "same industry" as a test to decide
when picketing is constitutionally protected and when it is not is highly
superficial and also ignores actual facts and everyday happenings.
The Ritter and Meadowmoor cases seem to have one very important
thing in common. That is the idea of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote
both opinions, that all things should be stretched almost to the breaking
point in order to hold any act of a state constitutional. This idea seems to
be an unjustifiable extension of the philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes. How-
ever, as applied by the latter the idea was restricted to such questions as
whether state regulation of business, hours of labor and other ordinary in-
stances of the exercise of state police power, violated the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. He realized that in the field of civil liberties,
especially freedom of speech and press, the mandatory terms of the Con-
stitution did not allow such indulgence for state action which might infringe
these freedoms. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who originated the clear and
present danger test, in the case of Sckenck v. United States.64
In the Meadowmoor case Mr. Justice Frankfurter says that the master,
to whom the case was referred by the lower state court, found that there
64. 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
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had been violence and that peaceful picketing in the future would contain
a threat and amount to coercion because of such past violence. The Su-
preme Court of Illinois affirmed this and "We can reject such a determina-
tion only if we can say that it is so without warrant as to be a palpable
evasion of the constitutional guarantee . ."" of free speech and press. He
goes on to say that Illinois has power to protect its shopkeepers from
violence and that if Illinois chooses to do so by use of an injunction, as
here, it is all right and the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent it.
The state does not have to rely on the police to keep order, it has chosen
to use the injunction for this purpose and it has the power to so choose.
This deference to the choice of the state is even more apparent in the Ritter
case. The opinion in that case states: ". . . Texas has declared that its
general welfare would not be served if, in a controversy between a contractor
and building workers' unions, the unions were permitted to bring to bear
the full weight of familiar weapons of industrial combat against a restaurant
business, which, as a business, has no nexus with the building dispute but
which happens to be owned by a person who contracts with the builder."10
Again he says, "Texas has deemed it desirable to insulate from the dispute
an establishment which industrially has no connection with the dispute."0 7
The opinion goes on to say that Texas can limit the sphere within which the
labor controversy must be kept and the limitation set up by Texas is a
reasonable regulation and therefore allowable. This language and reason-
ing is all very well and proper where the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment alone is involved. In such cases the state regulation is
bad only if it is so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary and capricious.6
However, in cases like the present, more is involved. Not only the Four-
teenth, but also the First Amendment69 must be considered. The protection
provided against acts of the Federal Government by the First Amendment,
is now given against acts of the states. This result is reached by reading
the guarantees found in the First Amendment into the word liberty found
65. 312 U. S. 287, 294 (1941).
66. 62 Sup. Ct. 807, 809 (1942). Italics added.
67. Id. at 810. Italics added.
68. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932) (dissent by Brandeis); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934); and cases cited.
69. The relevant part of the First Amefidment is: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
[Vol. 8
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in the due process clause of the Fourteenth.70 The language of the First
Amendment is mandatory. Thus any action by the government (either state
or federal) that abridges freedom of speech or press, would seem to be
inconsistent with this amendment. Of course it is recognized that, from the
nature of things, no right is absolute. Government can and must protect
itself and it was in such a case that Mr. Justice Holmes evolved the clear
and present danger test.71 Also, police regulations of the state that are nec-
essary for such purposes as the protection of public health, safety and morals
may subject the right of free speech to reasonable regulation. However, all
such things must be sharply inspected and their necessity must be clear
before they can be allowed.72 The presumption that state acts are valid
is proper when the due process clause alone is involved. In such cases the
party claiming unconstitutionality is required to show beyond all reason-
able doubt that the state action is arbitrary and unreasonable and beyond
the powers retained by the state under the Federal Constitution. However,
the protection given to free speech and press, by reason of the mandatory
language of the First Amendment, is of a higher order, and any abridgment
or infringement must be justified or be struck down as unconstitutional.
There is no presumption in its favor. The clear and present danger test is
the best criterion yet formulated for deciding whether the abridgment is
justified or not. Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Abrams
v. United States73 expressed the importance of the constitutional guaranty
of free speech as follows: "It is only the present danger of immediate evil or
an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in" setting a limit to the
expression of opinion.. . ." 4 Later in the same opinion he said: "... (people
have come to believe) that the ultimate good desired' is better reached by
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at
70. Since Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925), this has been
assumed and the Court has never expressed any doubt It is now so well settled
as not to require ciiation of authority.
71. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
72. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927); Stromberg v. California, 283
U. S. 359 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931); DeJonge v. Oregon,
299 U. S. 353 (1937); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S.
147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Bridges v. California,
62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941).
73. 250 U. S. 616 (1919). This was an appeal from a conviction under the
Espionage Act during World War I. Thus only the First Amendment was involved.
1943]
21
Howard: Howard: Freedom of Speech and Labor
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1943
46 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
any rate is the theory of our Constitution .... While that experiment (free
speech) is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten imme-
diate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that
an immediate check is required to save the country.... Only the emergency
that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil coun-
sels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command (of
the First Amendment)."; Thus we see that where the constitutional pro-
tection of freedom of speech and press is involved, there is no presumption
of constitutionality of state action and the idea of letting the states do what
they want to, if at all possible, is not proper. The protection of freedom of
speech to the person, or a group of people, is the important thing and the
court should guard this jealously; they should not be loath to declare a state
law unconstitutional for this reason.
Thus while this philosophy of Mr. Justice Frankfurter may explain the
result of the Meadowmoor and Ritter cases, it does not constitute a suf-
ficient justification for the abridgment of freedom of speech involved. In fact
it only gives more cogency to the arguments of the dissenting opi-nions.7'
Several times in this article the clear and present danger test, as form-
ulated by Mr. Justice Holmes in the case of Scenck v: United States,7 has
been referred to. In the language of that opinion:, "The question in every
case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.",
The words clear and present danger make a useful handle and because
of this it is easy to think of this as a mechanical test. However, when the
idea behind the words is understood it is seen to be the very antithesis of
mechanical. As Mr. Justice Holmes says: "It is a question of proximity
and degree."' 9 Just because the government, federal or state, wants to
impose a certain regulation or penalty, the test is not satisfied. The mere
74.. Id. at 628.
75. Id. at 630.
76. Such fuzzy reasoning, with dissenting opinions that would protect free-
dom of speech, is well illustrated in the more recent case of Jones v. City of Opelika,
62 Sup. Ct. 1231 (1942).
77. 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
78. Id. at 52.,
79. Ibid.
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legislative choice of means to combat an existing evil or attain a desired
and desirable end, is not enough. There must be some very important rea-
son that amounts to strict necessity before any abridgment of the constitu-
tional guaranty can be allowed. The infringement on freedom of speech and
press can be tolerated only when the utterance Will result in very great harm
to the community and when there is no other way to protect that com-
munity. Only then can it be said that this test has been satisfied. The mere
possibility of injury or danger is not enough. The danger threatened must be
clear, it must at least be of such a nature that man, from his imperfect
experience, can say, not that it will probably occur, but that, barring some
unforseeable circumstance or change, it will happen. Also the danger must
be a present one.80 It can not be something that it is thought may cause
harm in the distant future. Man can not predict the results of such stimuli
over more than a relatively short period of time. Thus the danger that is
clear must also be one that will occur, or begin, within the time that human
experience will allow a reasonably accurate prediction. It must not be so
remote that it becomes probable that some change, or unforseen circum-
stance, will divert the stimulus of the freely exercised speech to a result not
foreseen at the time the words were uttered.
When this test is thus considered it is not in the least mechanical. It
takes various forms in various cases. There are many ways of expressing it
and sometimes it is not expressly set forth at all. However, a study of the
cases dealing with civil liberties leads to the conclusion that most of the
sound ones have used this clear and present danger test.,' No case has ever
criticized this test or advanced any reason why it should not be used. Some
cases have reached the result of protecting freedom of speech, press and
80. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) (concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Brandeis); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937).
81. This clear and present danger test is discussed in many cases. Often
where the majority opinion goes off on some improper tangent there is a dissent
based on it. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919) Dissent, Holmes; Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S.
466 (1920) Dissent, Brandeis; Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920)
Dissent, Brandeis; Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925) Dissent,
Holmes; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) Concurring opinion by
Brandeis; People v. Garcia, 37 Cal. App, (2d) 753, 98 P. (2d) 265 (1939); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940);
Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (1940); Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago,
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287 (1941) Dissent, Black;
Bridges v. California, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941); Bakery and Pastry Drivers and
Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 62 Sup. Ct. 816 (1942).
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religion without expressly using the test 2 but it is well to note that in the
cases in which questionable infringements on these freedoms have been
allowed, the Court has not purported to find such clear and present danger
to exist, but rather has ignored this test altogether.8 3 Mr. Justice Brandeis
in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. Californiae4 makes the substance of
this test plain and comprehensble. He says:
"This Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to deter-
mine when danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger
may be and yet be deemed present; and what degree of evil shall be
deemed sufficiently substantial to justify resort to abridgment of
free speech and assembly as a means of protection. To reach
sound conclusions on these matters, we must bear in mind why
a State is, ordinarily, denied the power to prohibit dissemination of
social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its
citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil consequence.
"Those who won our independence ... believed that freedom
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indis-
pensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that with-
out free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to free-
dom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty;
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government ....
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. . . . To justify suppression of free speech
there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result
if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to be-
lieve that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be rea-
sonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious
one.... But even advocacy of violation (of law), however repre-
hensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where
82. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U. S. 697 (1931); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937); Lovell v. City ofGriffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,
307 U. S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147(1939); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
83. Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919); Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U. S. 466 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S 239 (1920); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925), See 6 Mo. L. REV. 106; Milk Wagon Drivers
Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287 (1941);Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 62 Sup.
Ct. 807 (1942); Jones v. City of Opelika, 62 Sup. Ct. 1231 (1942).
84. 274 U. S. 357.(1927).
[Vol. 8
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the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indi-
cate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on.... In order
to support a finding of clear and 'present danger it must be shown
either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was
advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that
such advocacy was then contemplated.
a... no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and
present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminerit
that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion....
Only an emergency can justify repression.... It is therefore always
open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and as-
sembly by showing that there was no emergency justifying it.
"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to
prohibition of these functions essential to effective democracy, unless
the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech
and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappro-
priate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society.
... The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the State."85
Thus it is seen that the freedom of speech and press is given the
utmost in protection; that only grave danger to society, which will more
than likely occur and occur shortly, will justify any abridgment or in-
fringement of these personal freedoms. This is as it should be and as it
was intended by the framers of the Constitution. There is and can be no
question that if these considerations which go to make up the clear and
present danger test had been considered in the decision of the Meadow-
mroor"O and RittersT cases, the injunctions would have been denied. There
was actually no danger to society in either case. The danger comes rather
from the suppression that follows from the injunction. There was of course
danger to the businesses picketed. The profits from them would be les-
sened, perhaps even the vendor system involved in the Meadowmoor case
would have been destroyed. However, this is not such grave and imminent
danger to society as Mr. Justice Brandeis speaks of as the only justification
for the abridgment of free speech. The explanation has, of course, been
85. Id. at 374-378. Italics added. It should be carefully noted that it is harm
to society or the state and not to an individual or group of individuals that justifies
this abridgment.
86. 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
87. 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (1942).
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previously pointed out; the predilection to sustain state action in all
possible instances.
The simple conclusion from this study is that because of the affirma-
tive and emphatic language used in the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, freedom of speech and of the press are rights as nearly
absolute as any rights can be in modern society. These rights can therefore
only be abridged in cases of overwhelming necessity; and the proper
criterion to be used in determining when such necessity exists is what
has been called here the clear and present danger test.88 When it is not
used there is danger of an overemphasis on what should properly be sub-
sidiary issues, resulting in questionable decisions. When this test is under-
stood and used it forces a determination of whether or not there is that
overwhelming necessity which alone justifies abridgment, and thus the
danger of mistakes and suppression is reduced to a minimum.
There is another and closely related question that has but recently
arisen. To what exteni does the right of free speech protect utterances
of the employer? This question is usually raised by orders of the National
Labor Relations Board and not by the ordinary process of injunction. 89
The problem. involved is a delicate one and the United States Supreme
Court has not yet passed on it. The Federal Constitution protects the
right of free speech to everyone; employer, employee and stranger to the
conflict. However, statements of the employer may be such that they
have the effect of intimidating and coercing the employee and thus deprive
him of his right to free choice of collective bargaining representatives given
him by the National Labor Relations Act. As it was expressed by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, "The employer has the right to have and to express
a preference for one union over another (or against all unions) so long
as that expression is the mere expression of opinion in the exercise of free
speech and is not the use of economic power to coerce, compel or buy
the support of the employees for or against a particular labor organization." 90
88. It is not contended that this is the only possible criterion, but it is sub-
mitted that this is the most nearly adequate one that has as yet been formulated.
89. The cases of Texas and New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railway
and Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930); and Virginian Ry. v. System Fed-
eration No. 40, 84 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936), both arose under the Rail-
road Employment Act. The Supreme Court of the United States did not consider
the problem when'it reviewed the last mentioned case, 300 U. S. 515 (1937).
90. Continental Box Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 113 F. (2d)
93, 97 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940). The problem in this case was employer domination
of a local union.
[Vol. 8
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The position of the employer and his ability to fire or otherwise discriminate
against an employee who goes against his wishes may well give to his
statements the force of coercion and therefore it is argued that such state-
ments by the employer are not protected by the First Amendment. The
cases in the various circuit courts of appeals are in conflict but if the right
of free speech is to be given as much sweep and force in this situation as it
has in others, it would seem that the implications of many of these cases
will have to be disregarded. There are very few cases squarely on the
point. Most of them find some reason why a square decision is not needed.
The reason most often given is that there were acts of the employer which
justify the finding of the National Labor Relations Board that he engaged
in unfair labor practices, without consideration of his statements. There
can be, of course, no doubt that the employer can, by verbal threats, ef-
fectively coerce his employees into doing what he wants them to do or
prevent them from doing what they want to do in the matter of union
organization and collective bargaining. Actual open threats are unusual
today. The form is generally more subtle and this greatly increases the
difficulty of deciding what amounts to such coercion as will take the em-
ployer's statements out of the protection of the First Amendment. This is
the idea behind many of the cases. In Virginian Railway Co. v. System
Federation No. 40, the court says ". .. and it is a violation of the terms, as
well as of the spirit of the act, for the employer to address arguments to the
employee couched in such terms, or presented in such manner, as to lead
the employee to fear that he may suffer from the action of the employer
if he does not follow the wishes of the latter in making his choice of rep-
resentatives."' 1 There are several other cases in which the order of the
National Labor Relations Board is general in character and the court
does not have to expressly decide the point, but which contain dicta that
show the attitude of the court similar to that in the Virginian Railway case.2
The courts seem to question whether the acts of the employer violate the
91. 84 F. (2d) 641, 643 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936). Aff'd on other grounids, 300
U. S. 515 (1937).
92. Montgomery Ward and Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 107" F.
(2d) 555 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); National Labor Relations Board v. Elkland Leather
Co., 114 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940); National Labor Relations Board v.
Chicago Apparatus Co., 116 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); National Labor
Relations Board v. Reed and Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F. (2d) 874 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941).
Cert. denied, 313 U. S. 595 (1941); National Labor Relations Board v. Lux-
uray, Inc., 123 F. (2d) 106 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); National Labor Relations
Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584 (1941).
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National Labor Relations Act and if it is found that they do then the
courts conclude that the Board's order should be upheld. Whether such
statements may be protected by the First Amendment is seldom directly
considered. The case of National Labor Relations Board v. Elkland Leath-
er Co.93 is typical of these cases. The court finds that the Board was
justified in finding the statement involved "was manifestly designed to
discourage organizational efforts" indicates that it thinks such action by
the employer was reprehensible and violative of the policy of the act, and
then avoids the issue by saying that no direct opinion is required.
The prevailing idea that any statement of the employer will have a
coercive effect because of his economic position would seem to lead natural-
ly to the conclusion that they amount to what has been called "verbal
acts" and thus are not protected as an exercise of free speech.9' However,
the only case that deals with this idea is National Labor Relations Board
v. Reed and Prince Mfg. Co.9' This case cites the Meadowmoor case which
at least comes close to using the "verbal act" doctrine. In the Reed and
Prince case the court says that "Anti-union propaganda addressed by an
employer to his employees may be more than a mere expression of opin-
ion, may 'lose its significance as an appeal to reason', in a context of violence,
intimidation or coercion. At this point the employer's constittutional right of
free speech ends."98 The court says that this anti-union propaganda is one
phase of the refusal to bargain but concludes that there is sufficient evidence
to support the Board's finding without holding that the propaganda, in and
of itself, is an unfair labor practice. The fallacy of the argument set out in
the above quotation has been pointed out before and the arguments against
it are as cogent when the doctrine is applied to the employer as when
applied to the employee. One of the few cases that have made a decision
directly on the question of the employer free speech is National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Luxuray, Inc. The Board issued a cease and desist order
against making'anti-union statements and the court enforced the order. The
employer told his employees that they did not have to join any union, advised
them against joining and said that they would get along best by working
93. 114 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
94. This "verbal act doctrine is explained and applied in Gompers v. Bucks
Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
95. 118 F. (2d) 874 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941). Cert. denied, 313 U. S. 595
(1941).
96. Id, at 889.
97. 123 F. (2d) 106 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
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in harmony with the company. The court, through Judge Augustus N.
Hand, said, "But freedom of speech does not extend to interested appeals
by an employer to induce his men not to exercise the right of collective
bargaining and not to become members of a labor union .... In view of his
power to discharge the employees they might fairly suppose not only that
it was not to their interest to become members of the union but that they
might suffer from such an association. "108 The National Labor Relations
Act does not require that the employees join any union or other organiza-
tion. The employer has great interests in the activities of his employees
in such matters and his expression of opinion and even advice would seem
to be quite proper. There is nothing in this case to show that the state-
ments of the employer had any element of threat and thus the restrictive
view of the court seems unjustified.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Link-Belt Co.99 the Supreme
Court of the United States, in a case involving employer domination of
a local union, uses language which taken alone would seem to indicate a
very narrow construction of the employer's right to free speech. However,
when it is read in its context of the discussion of employer domination of
the union, this language loses its significance in relation to the problem
here being considered. Thus there is still no intimation as to what the
United States Supreme Court will do when it finally considers this question.
Not all of the cases put such strict limits on the employer's right of
free speech, but this again is mostly dicta. 0 0 The past attitude of the em-
ployer has often been considered important. Where the court considers
that the employer has been very fair and cooperative with the employees it
tends to say that rather emphatic expressions of opinion are permissible.
This is true -not only of dicta but also in the case of Midland Steel Products
98. Id. at 108.
99. 311 U. S. 584 (1941). See also International Association of Machinists;
Tool and Die Makers Lodge No. 35,v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U. S.
72 (1940).
100. Texas and New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steam-
ship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930); National Labor Relations Board v. Union
Pacific Stages, Inc., 99 F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); National Labor Relations
Board v. Falk Corp., 102 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Jefferson Electric Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 102 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Con-
tinental Box Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 113 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A.
5th, 1940); Midland Steel Products Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 113
F. (2d) 800 (C. C. A..6th, 1940); National Labor Relations Board v. Ford Motor
Co., 114 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940); National Labor Relations Board v.
Federbush Co., 121 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Owens-Illinois Glass Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 123 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) (dissent).
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Co. v. National Labor Relations Board'10 it was the main basis for reversing
the order of the Board. The courts seem mainly to be worried about whether
the Act does or was intended to prevent statements of opinion or desire
by the employer. Often the court finds that the statements of the employer
do not violate the Act and adds dicta to the effect that if the Act were con-
strued to prohibit such statements it would be unconstitutional. Thus the
discussion of the constitutional question in most of the cases is haphazard
at best.10 2
The case of National Labor Relations Board v. Federbush Co.10 3 makes
the usual statements that pay lip service to the theory of constitutional
right of free speech but adds that freedom of speech operates only when
it is in fact used for persuasion. When the employer makes known his
opinions and wishes it has additional force, other than persuasion, because
of his economic position, and is therefore not protected by the Constituton.
This is of course another form of the usual problem, but the court goes
on and says that it is proper for the National Labor Relations Board to
draw the line between what is persuasion and what is force and indicates
that the courts will not themselves look into this. This idea is at variance
with the accepted scope of judical review in cases involving civil liberties.' 4
The most important case so far decided on this question is National
Labor Relations Board v. Ford Motor Co.'05 The court in this case seems
doubtful that-there was any actual coercion from the statements of the
employer. Also it indicates doubt that the National Labor Relations, Act
prevents anti-union propaganda. However, the decision of the court seems
to be based on the more fundamental constitutional protection of free
speech. The Constitution is held to protect utterances of the employer
as well as those of the employee and the order of the board against circula-
tion of such anti-union propaganda is reversed. It is submitted that the
result of this case is proper, but the reasoning is far from clear. There are
101. 113 F. (2d) 800 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940); See also National Labor Relations
Board v. Falk Corp., 102 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
102. Jefferson Electric Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 102 F. (2d) 949(C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Continental Box Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 113F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940); Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 123 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
103. 121 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
104. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Cant-
,vell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
105. 114 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940). Cert. denied, 312 U. S.
689 (1941).
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of course limits to the free speech of an employer as well as an employee.
The right of the employer is just as fundamental as that of the employee.
The Ford case sheds very little light on cases which may arise in the future.
The practical application of the employer's right of free speech has not
yet been put on a firm foundation. None of the cases as yet have con-
sidered the broad problem. They all decide that the particular statement
is permissible or not under the peculiar facts of the case and do 'not explain
how the conclusion is arrived at. In the field of employee freedom of speech
this article advocates the use of the clear and present danger test. No rea-
son is perceived why the protection of that test should not also apply to
speech of the employer.
The National Labor Relations Act does not expressly deal with state-
ments of the employer. The courts have not as yet expressly attacked the
question of interpretation of the statute on this point. The Act declares it
to be an unfair labor practice ". . . for an employer (1) To interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 157 of this title (the right of self-organization and collective bar-
gaining)."'" Thus the courts must conclusively decide that statements of
the employer are included in the words "interfere with, restrain or coerce"
before the statute is violated. The exact scope of these words has not as yet
been found by the courts. If the courts should decide that these words
of the statute include all statements of the employer bearing upon union
organization and activity, the interpretation would seem to render the
statute unconstitutional as violating the First Amendment to the Federal
Consitution. Of course, not all statements of the employer are coercive and
there is no basis for holding that all such statements violate the statute.
However, if the statute is construed to prohibit all utterances of the em-
ployer that might, for any reason, have a coercive effect on the employees,
there is still grave question of the constitutionality of the statute. As has
been pointed out by almost all of the cases,1 0 7 the economic position of the
employer may give his seemingly impersonal statements of opinion a coercive
106 49 STAT. 452 (1936); 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (1940). Section 157 is as follows:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collective through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargainng or other
mutual aid or protection." 49 STAT. 452; 29 U. S. C. A. § 157.
107. See especially: National Labor Relations Board v. Reed and Prince Mfg.
Co., 118 F. (2d) 874 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941). Cert. denied, 313 U. S. 595 (1941);
National Labor Relations Board v. Luxuray, Inc., 123 F. (2d) 106 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941); Continental Box Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 113 F. (2d)
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effect on his employees. However, it must not be forgotten that statements
by employees in connection with strikes and picketing may also have, and
often are intended to have, a coercive effect on the employer. Yet such
statements by employees are constitutionally protected. But, as is pointed
out in the Ford case,10 it is the purpose of the National Labor Relations
Act to protect the employees from the discrimination which the statements
of the employer are supposed to threaten. The existence of this Act and
the enforcement machinery set up under it weakens the most persistent
argument for limiting the scope of employer free speech in two ways. First,
this machinery is used to protect the rights of the employees, and thus the
supposed threats can not be carried out by the employer; i.e. actual dis-
crimination by the employer is stopped, or remedied after it has occurred.
Second, because of the existence of this machinery the employee is not so
fearful of the displeasure of the employer. He can and usually does go ahead
and exercise his free will in spite of the employer's utterances, which, be-
cause of the Act have less, or no, coercive effect. Difficulty in proving dis-
crimination does not necessarily affect this. If, because of difficulties of
proof, the machinery set up under the National Labor Relations Act can
not entirely protect the employee against all discriminatory acts of the em-
ployer, that is no justification for restricting his freedom of speech. This
difficulty of proof is present in all fields of the law and is no reason for
infringing on constitutional rights.
The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act as declared by Con-
gress"09 is to prevent obstruction to the free flow of commerce. In order
to accomplish this the Act sets up procedure to make collective bargaining
effective and gives the employees certain rights in relation to it. As long
as the employees understand that they are actually at liberty to exercise
their own free will in such matters as union affiliation and the selection of
collective bargaining representatives, it is evident that utterances of the
employer are protected. In fact, under these circumstances there is no
violation of the Act and thus no reason to call upon constitutional protection.
It is only when statements of the employer can be said to have a coercive
effect on the employees and thus may violate the Act, that the First Amend-
93 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940); National Labor Relations Board vfl Federbush Co., 121
F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
108. 114 F. (2d) 905, 914 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940). Cert. denied, 312 U. S.
689 (1941). See also the dissenting opinion in Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 123 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
109.1 49 STAT. 457; 29 U..S. C. A. § 151.
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ment to the Federal Constitution is involved. The evil which Congress can
try to prevent is the interference with and obstruction of the free flow of
commerce that results from labor disputes. It is clear that not every inter-
ference with the policy of Congress expressed in this statute is a justification
for an abridgment of free speech. The question thus becomes one 6f
whether the statements of the employer cause such interference as to create
such a clear and present danger of an evil which Congress can prevent
that the abridgment of free speech is justified. Not all coercive effect places
the statements of the employer beyond the protection of the First Amend-
ment. It is only when the statements of the employer have such coercive
force that they threaten great harm to society that such a clear and present
danger can be said to exist. This danger to society results when the coer-
cion of the employer's statements creates a danger of complete suppression
of the rights of collective bargaining and union organization given by the
Act. This in turn creates a grave danger of serious obstruction to the free
flow of interstate commerce upon which the economic life of the nation
rests. When this danger threatens in a clear and present manner the test
has been met and the statements are no longer protected by the con-
stitutional right of free speech.
It is not statements that may make a few timid workers slow to exer-
cise their rights, but statements that are calculated to coerce most of the
workers affected, to refrain from exercising their rights, that meets the
clear and present danger test. Of course, in applying this test all the cir-
cumstances and conditions will have to be carefully considered. This con-
sideration is primarily the task of the National Labor Relations Board.
However, the courts should continue to look into the facts when the decisions
of the Board are challenged, and determine for themselves whether the
coercion which the Board has found to exist is of such seriousness as to
justify the abridgment of free speech found in the challenged order. In
other words, court review should be as broad here as in other civil liberties
cases that come to the Supreme Court of the United States.11°
It is submitted that in the cases that have so far come to the courts,
there is no conclusive showing of a clear and present danger. There may be
inconvenience and delay resulting from such statements of the employer,
but they are not of such seriousness as will justify the abridgment of
110. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington) 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
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freedom of speech in the face of the mandatory language of the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The National Labor Relations Act gives the employees rights of col-
lective bargaining but it can not be forgotten that the employer has
rights and interests also. These labor controversies do not operate in a
vacuum and Congress does not force acceptance of any particular union, or
any union at all. Thus the employer should be allowed to speak freely
until the result of his speech creates such a clear and present danger that
it is proper to limit it. Mere statements of opinion by the employer should
always be protected. The possible coercive effect from any such statement is
so problematical that it can not be said to create a clear danger. It is sub-
mitted that nothing short of an actual threat will meet this clear and
present danger test, although any statements that create a danger of defeat-
ing all collective bargaining in a plant would be included. Of course the
threat may be either express or implied. But the courts should find an
implied threat only on clear and convincing evidence, and no presump-
tion from the economic position of the employer should be indulged in.
Here, as in other cases involving free speech, it is more important that this
fundamental right be protected than that every possible interference with
the policy of Cbngress be checked.
Thus we see that in spite of the great strides made in recent years, the
exact scope of the right of free speech is as yet far from clear. However,
the clear and present danger test would seem to be the best guide that has
as yet been evolved for searching out the boundaries of this great and funda-
mental right.
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